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Abstract This study investigates the properties of a durative modifier that exclu-
sively targets result states in Turkish. We call this modifier RSM, standing for Result
State Modifier. What is peculiar about RSM is that it can express the actual duration
of a result state, as well as a non-actual duration for an actual result state. Our goal
is to describe the conditions under which these two interpretations are licensed and
to provide a compositional analysis of how these interpretations are derived. We
argue that dispositions play a key role in the way RSM can describe a non-actual
duration for an actual result state.
Keywords: Turkish, result states, durative modifiers, intentions, dispositions
1 Introduction
Turkish has a temporal modifier that exclusively targets result states. We set aside
its morphological complexity and label it as RSM, standing for Result State Modi-


















RSM tells us something about the duration of a result state. For example, RSM
in (2a) asserts that the crashed state of YouTube lasted for two hours. Hence, RSM
in the inchoative sentence in (2a) comes with an actuality entailment regarding
the duration of the result state of YouTube being crashed. This is diagnosed by the
* We would like to thank the audience of SALT 31 as well as Bridget Copley and Fabienne Martin for
discussion and feedback. We are grateful to our informants for providing native speaker judgments.
All errors are, of course, ours.
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infelicitous follow-up in (2b), which contradicts what is asserted in (2a). This is










Lit: ‘YouTube crashed for two hours.’
 S: YouTube being in a crashed state
 S was two-hour-long
b. #. . . ama bir saat sonra geri geldi.
‘. . . but it came back after an hour.’
Notably, RSM does not always describe the actual duration of a result state. For
example, although the sentence in (3a) entails that the box ended up on the table
as understood from the infelicitous follow-up in (3b), it does not have an actuality
entailment regarding the duration of this result state. A follow-up sentence asserting
that the box remained on the table less than two hours does not contradict (3a), as













Lit: ‘Melis put the box on the table for two hours.’
 S: the box being on the table
2 S was two-hour-long
b. #. . . ama kutu hiç masanın üzerinde olmadı.
‘. . . but the box was never even on the table.’
c. . . . ama beş dakika sonra annesi odasına götürdü.
‘. . . but her mother took it to her room after five minutes.’
Intuitively, in (3a), RSM seems to encode the intended duration for the result
state. Therefore, the sentence in (3a) appears to mean that Melis put the box on the
table, wanting it to be there for two hours. This raises an important question: how is
it that while a result state is entailed in (3a), a modifier that talks about its duration
fails to state its actual duration?
We propose to capture this dual behavior of RSM by positing that RSM phrases
like iki saatliğine ‘for two hours’ may correspond to one of the structures in (4). The
head that we label DISP, standing for disposition, is what will enable the ‘intended
duration’ interpretation. On the other hand, when DISP is absent, we predict the
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actual duration entailment. Crucially, there are cases where DISP is precluded,
simply because it is contextually undefined. Our main goal is to explicate under
which conditions DISP may or may not be licensed. In other words, we will identify







This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we lay out the basic set of
observations about the distribution of RSM. In section 3, we discuss how we can
make sense of these observations. In section 4, we show that it is possible to compo-
sitionally implement the ideas put forth in Section 3. In section 5, we demonstrate
that the two structures in (4) are not freely available. More specifically, we argue
that (4a) has to be used whenever DISP is licensed. Otherwise, the interpretation is
coerced into the reading that derives from the structure in (4b). Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2 When is RSM licensed?
Accomplishments and achievements are two classes of verbs that can provide result
states (Dowty 1979; Parsons 1990; Talmy 1991; Landman 1992; Rappaport Hovav
& Levin 1998; Ramchand 2008). RSM is sensitive to the possibility of a result state
being present. (2a) entails that YouTube ended up in a crashed state, and (3a) entails
that the box ended up on the table. We argue that RSM is a special type of durative
modifier that requires such result states. What constitutes evidence for this claim is
the observation that RSM is entirely incompatible with activity denoting verbs which









‘Selin ran (for two hours)intended.’
On the other hand, as predicted, when an activity is delimited as in (6), RSM
becomes fully acceptable. This corroborates our characterization of RSM as a result
1 Turkish has another durative modifier, e.g. iki saat boyunca ‘for two hours’, which indicates the
actual duration of activities and states. Quite expectedly, it is incompatible with accomplishments
and achievements unless they are coerced into iterative construals.
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Lit: ‘They carried the box to the room for two hours.’
 S: the box being in the room
2 S was two-hour-long
Accordingly, we take RSM to be a sublexical modifier of result states, which is
indicative of its very low attachment in the logical form.2 What is peculiar about
RSM is its dual behavior mentioned in the introduction. Sometimes, it talks about
the actual duration of a result state as in the inchoative sentence in (7a) while at
other times it talks about a non-actual duration as seen in the causative sentence
(8a). We are able to identify this contrast by comparing the appropriateness of the









Lit: ‘The sky darkened for ten minutes.’
 S: the sky being dark
 S was ten-minute-long
b. #. . . ama üç dakika sonra açıldı.











Lit: ‘Melis put the box on the table for two hours.’
 S: the box being on the table
2 S was two-hour-long
b. . . . ama beş dakika sonra annesi odasına götürdü.
‘. . . but her mother took it to her room after five minutes.’
Hence, what is responsible for the actuality of the duration in (7) and the non-
actuality of the duration in (8) remains unexplained. One could argue that in cases
where there is no actuality entailment regarding the duration of a result state, the
result state itself is non-actual, as we see in ‘non-culminating accomplishments’
(Tatevosov 2008; Martin 2015; Alexiadou, Martin & Schäfer 2017; Martin & Schäfer
2017; Martin 2019; Gyarmathy & Altshuler 2020). We observe that RSM is able
2 We leave an in-depth investigation of whether RSM is compatible with stative adjectives and stative
verbs to future work.
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to modify both possible and actual result states, namely, it is not parasitic on the
presence of an actual successful culmination. Rather, it is sensitive to the possibility
of culmination. For example, although there is no culmination in (9a), we can still












Lit: ‘They threw the box onto the roof for two hours.’
≈ they threw the box onto the roof, wanting it to be there for two hours
2 The box ended up on the roof.
b. . . . ama sert rüzgardan, kutu çatıya hiç ulaşmadı.
‘. . . but because of the strong wind, the box never made it to the roof.’
Since the result state in (9a) is not actual, the expected duration of this state
could not have been actualized, either. However, the non-actuality of the duration is
not dependent on whether the result state is actual or not. We observe that even when
the result state is actual, an actuality inference regarding its duration may easily
be cancelled, as shown in (10b). This shows that the absence of actual duration
entailment cannot be due to a possibility modal in the CAUS head (Koenig & Davis
2001; Beavers 2010; Beavers & Koontz-Garboden 2020), for this would predict the











Lit: ‘I put the box on the table for two hours.’
b. . . . ama beş dakika sonra annem odasına götürdü.
‘. . . but my mother took it to her room after five minutes.’
c. #. . . ama kutu hiç masanın üzerinde olmadı.
‘. . . but the box was never even on the table.’
In this section, we have shown that RSM can only modify result states. Hence, it
seems that it has to operate at a sublexical level. Furthermore, we have shown that a
result state S being actual does not guarantee that the duration RSM describes for
S is actual. In other words, RSM can describe a non-actual duration for an actual
result state. Hence, we need an account that explains this modal-like behavior of
RSM. Furthermore, we need to understand when this modal-like behavior of RSM is
licensed.
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3 A case for dispositions
In the previous section, we have established that RSM can sometimes be used to
report a non-actual duration for an actual result state. We diagnose this modal-like














Lit: ‘Melis put the box on the table for two hours.’
2 The box remained on the table for two hours.
b. . . . ama beş dakika sonra anne-si odasına götürdü.
‘. . . but her mother took it to her room after five minutes.’
We have also shown that such a follow-up is not always permitted, as illustrated
in the example (12). We have taken the impossibility of cancelling the duration
inference to constitute evidence for what we have labelled the actual duration entail-
ment. As mentioned previously, the intuitive difference between the two situations
is that Melis acts intentionally to cause a result state in (11a) whereas there is no









Lit: ‘The sky darkened for ten minutes.’
 The sky remained dark for ten minutes.
b. #. . . ama üç dakika sonra açıldı.
‘. . . but it cleared after three minutes.’
Then, a preliminary hypothesis based on this contrast is that intentions play an
important role in making the modal-like reading possible. Indeed, this expectation is
confirmed by the sentence in (13a) which involves a causative change of state verb,
yet has an inanimate subject that cannot have intentions. We observe that the actual





















b. #. . . ama yarım asır sonra arkeologlar küllerden kurtardı.
‘. . . but archaeologists recovered it from the ashes after half a century.’
Therefore, the generalization seems to be that the presence of an intentional
causer licenses the modal-like interpretation where RSM describes a non-actual
duration for an actual result state. On the other hand, in the absence of an intentional
causer (as in inchoative sentences and sentences with causers that cannot have
intentions), we find that RSM simply describes the actual duration of actual result
states.
This generalization, albeit simple and attractive, is not quite correct. We find
subtle contexts where RSM has its modal-like interpretation, even though the actual
result state it modifies does not come about due to intentional causation. For
example, in the context provided in (14a), there is an actual result state which is not
intentionally caused, and despite that, the duration expressed in (14b) can still be
non-actual as diagnosed by the felicitious follow-up in (14c).
(14) a. Context: All by accident, I pressed a switch button on a spacecraft,
causing the Mars passengers in the resting cabins to cryogenically
freeze. That button, when pressed, freezes any human in the cabins,
and automatically unfreezes them three months later. Luckily, we
didn’t have to wait that long. A crew member was able to unfreeze













Lit: ‘By accident, I froze the Mars passengers for three months.’
 S: Mars passengers being frozen
2 S was three-month-long
c. . . . ama teknik ekip bir günde sorunu çözdü.
‘. . . but the technical team solved the problem in a day.’
The data above is quite informative in that it shows us that intentions are not the
whole story. Piñón (1999) discusses counterparts of RSM in English, German, and
Hungarian, and argues that the modal-like interpretation is licensed under intentional
causation. Here, we argue that this account does not extend to the data in (14), for it
shows that even in the absence of an intentional agent, we can have the modal-like
interpretation, as diagnosed by the cancellability of the actuality inference regarding
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the duration of the relevant result state. Given that RSM cannot simply be tracking
intentions, pace Piñón (1999), we suggest that we need another notion that also
subsumes agentive intentions. In what follows, we show that the relevant notion is
dispositions.
In the example in (14), the button that causes cryogenic freezing has a disposition
relevant for the duration expressed by RSM. The context in (14a) indicates that the
button is programmed to freeze people in the cabins, once pressed, and keep them in
that state for three months. It seems that what RSM is picking on is this disposition of
the button towards causing a result state in which people in the cabins remain frozen
for three months. However, an intervention is still possible, such as the technical
team’s intervention, allowing the actuality inference to be easily cancelled, as in
(14c). Notice that this is fully parallel to the kinds of interventions that we have
seen in other examples where the result state was intentionally caused. What is
crucially different here is the fact that there is no intentional agent that acts to cause
the relevant result state in the first place. However, for the purposes of licensing the
modal-like interpretation for RSM, dispositions and agentive intentions appear to be
on a par.
Thus, we propose that the modal-like reading of RSM is dependent on the
presence of dispositions, which might be defined as generic properties, tendencies or
intentions of entities in the world. These are generally intentions for animate beings
but generic properties for inanimates (Copley & Martin 2014; Copley 2018). Copley
(2018) makes the observation that intentions of animates and generic properties of
inamimates behave uniformly in futurates. Futurates are clauses that "have future
reference in the absence of future-oriented morphology, with a ‘planned’ or ‘settled’
flavor" (Copley 2018: p. 1). See the examples in (15).
(15) a. I make the coffee tomorrow.
b. #I get sick tomorrow.
c. The sun rises at 6:00 tomorrow. (Copley 2018: p. 6)
(15a) is expected to be felicitous as a futurate because the intentional agent
there has the ability to intend or plan to make the coffee tomorrow whereas (15b) is
naturally infelicitous considering one does not usually plan to become sick. However,
the felicity of (15c) is surprising, for the sun cannot have intentions or the volition to
rise at a specific moment in time either. On the other hand, its generic property that
it rises at 6:00 according to how nature works in general makes it possible to use
the event of sun rising at 6:00 in a futurate. Copley (2018) therefore suggests that
the relevant notion here is dispositions. In (15a), the agent has a disposition towards
making coffee in the day that follows. Similarly, the sun has a disposition towards
rising at 6:00 because of how nature works in general.
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In a similar fashion, an intentional causer can have a disposition (i.e. intention)
to cause a result state that lasts for a particular period of time, just like the button
responsible for cryogenic freezing has a disposition to keep the people in the cabins
frozen for three months. In light of the present discussion about dispositions, let
us also reconsider (16), where the modal-like reading of RSM cannot be accessed.
We can now understand why. The cause in (16) is inanimate, hence cannot have
intentions. But more generally, it is impossible to construe a disposition ascribed to
a volcanic eruption for burying a city for a specific amount of time, either. Hence,
no disposition ascription is possible in this respect. We argue that whenever a
disposition ascription is impossible, RSM will have to describe the actual duration

















Lit: ‘The volcanic eruption buried the city under ashes for a thousand years.’
 The city remained buried under the ashes for a thousand years.
On the other hand, if the same verb is placed in a clause where an intentional
causer is present who has a disposition for a result state to hold for a period of time,













Lit: ‘The burglars buried the money here for a year.’
2 The money remained buried here for a year.
b. . . . ama polisler bir hafta sonra bulup sahibine verdiler.
‘. . . but the officers found and gave it to its owner a week later.’
Therefore, the absence of an actual duration entailment is dependent on the
presence of a disposition ascription. Of course, this is relevant not only for causative
change of state verbs, but also for inchoatives. Our theory predicts that inchoative
sentences that feature RSM will generally exhibit actual duration entailment, for they
often fail to make a suitable disposition available for the interpretation. However,
this is only a tendency, not a rule. We can think of contexts where a theme has a
disposition to undergo a change of state and remain in that state for a particular
period of time. For example, take the context in (18a) where there is a lake that
has a disposition towards being frozen for three months during winter every year.
Such a disposition being contextually salient makes it possible for RSM to assume
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its modal-like reading parasitic on dispositions. This is diagnosed by the possibility
of the felicitous inference cancellation test in (18c).
(18) a. Context: In the city that you live in, there is a lake that freezes every
year and remains frozen for three months starting from December to















Lit: ‘This year, the lake froze again for three months.’
2 The lake remained frozen for three months.
c. . . . ama bu kez bir hafta sonra eridi.
‘. . . but this time, it melted after one week.’
4 A compositional implementation
Recall that we assume that RSM phrases like iki saatliğine ‘for two hours’ may spell






We argue that both of these structures are sublexical modifiers which combine
with syntactic nodes that denote result states. For concreteness, we borrow the RESP
approach in Ramchand 2008, where the result state corresponds to a RESP projection
in the logical form of a complex event.4
3 There are two ways to implement this. We could take the Disposition head in (19a) to have no
overt morphological reflex and -liğine to spell out the Duration head. Alternatively, -liğine can be
a portmanteau in the sense of Nanosyntax (Starke 2009; Caha 2009) that can match the syntactic
structure [DISPP DISP [DURP DUR] ] or match any subtrees it contains, i.e. [DURP DUR]. The
two options have the same empirical coverage. Notably, neither option takes into account the overt
morphological complexity of -liğine, which we need to leave to a future occasion.
4 We take the Q that appears as a sister to RES to denote a property, which may syntactically correspond
















DUR takes a time interval t and returns a set of states which are t-long, as shown
in (22). Given this semantics for DUR, we predict actual duration entailment for all
actual result states in logical forms where DURP directly combines with a RESP.
(22) JDURK = λ t. λ s. s is t-long
Let us, for concreteness, take all causative change of state events, also feature a
CAUSE head taking RESP as its complement. The meanings we adopt for CAUS and
RES heads are provided in (23).5
(23) a. JCAUSK = λP〈s, t〉. λe. ∃s: e→ s & P(s)=1
b. JRESK = λQ. λx. λ s. Q(x)=1 in s

















Lit: ‘The volcanic eruption buried the city under ashes for a thousand years.’
5 The→ in the meaning of CAUS is the ‘leads to’ relation adopted from Ramchand 2008. However,
it should be noted that the implementation here is not entirely faithful to the Ramchandian event
composition.
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As shown in the derivation in (26), there is a state asserted to exist true of the
predicate that we derive by intersecting the meanings of DURP and RESP. For ex-
plicitness, we assume that the verbal root, which in this case identifies the manner
of the causing event, is intersected with the predicate of events that CAUSP denotes
(cf. Beavers & Koontz-Garboden 2020). Finally, the subject will be introduced by a
Kratzerian voice projection (Kratzer 1996), completing the logical form correspond-
ing to the event structure. Therefore, given the standard non-modal meanings for
perfective aspect and past tense, we fully predict the actual duration entailment.
(26) a. J 1 K = (by PM)
λ s. the city is under the ashes in s and s is 1000-year-long.
b. J 2 K = (by FA)
λe. ∃s: e→ s & J 1 K(s)=1
c. J 3 K = (by PM)
λe. ∃s: e→ s & J 1 K(s)=1 & bury(e)=1
As shown in (26), the derivation of the actual duration entailment is entirely
parasitic on the derivation of an actual result state. Recall, however, that non-actual
duration interpretation is available in the presence of actual result states. In other
words, RSM allows us to report non-actual durations (e.g. intended durations) for
actual result states. We argue that what makes this possible is the additional DISP
head that combines with a DURP. The DISP head projects a DISPP, which directly
combines with RESP. The modal meaning we give to the DISP head is provided
in (27). We argue that DISP quantifies over the set of worlds compatible with the
dispositions of a contextually salient entity, indicated as [Xdisp-holder in c] and asserts
that in each such world there is a state true of the intersection of RESP and DURP.
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Crucially, the meaning of DISP also passes up the meaning of RESP. This is what
allows non-actual durations to be reported for actual result states.
(27) JDISPKc, w = λP〈s, t〉. λQ〈s, t〉. λ s. Q(s)=1 ∧ ∀w’: w’ is compatible with the
dispositions of Xdisp-holder in c in w→ ∃s’ in w’ such that P(s’)=Q(s’)=1




















(30) a. J 1 Kw, c = (by FA)
λ s. the box is in the room in s & ∀w’: w’ is compatible with the
dispositions of Xspeaker in c in w→ ∃s’ in w’ such that the box is in the
room in s’ and s’ is two-hour-long
b. J 2 Kw, c = λe. ∃s: e→ s & J 1 K(s)=1 & put(e)=1
the set of events e such that there is a state s such that e leads to s and
the box is in the room in s and e is a putting event and
[in all worlds compatible with the dispositions of the speaker, there is
a state in which the box is in the room for two hours]
As can be seen in (30b), we derive an actual result state of the box being in the
room. In addition, there is a modal meaning, which DISP brings in. This is also
part of the assertion but does not interact with the event composition in any way.
The DISP head simply uses the information in DURP and RESP, accessing both, to
build a modal claim and makes it part of the assertion. This correctly predicts that
(28) entails that the speaker put the box in the room but does not entail that the box
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remained in the room for two hours.
Hence, the semantics we give to DISP accounts for our main observations. First,
we can now explain why the actuality inference regarding the duration of a result
state is easily cancellable in the presence of a disposition holder. The DISP head
intersects the meanings of DURP and RESP but only in possible worlds compatible
with the dispositions of a relevant disposition holder. Second, since the DISP head
does not interact with the event composition, actual result state entailments may
persist regardless of duration inferences.
Finally, note that the denotation of DISP contains a contextually retrieved dispo-
sition holder which, crucially, is not syntactically determined to be the causer/agent.
Recall, for example, that in (14), repeated below as (31), DISP seems to be picking up
the disposition that belongs to the button/the cyrogenic freezer it initiates. Crucially,
the syntax of (31) does not have a DP that corresponds to the button or the cyrogenic
freezer. Hence, we tentatively propose that DISP must be allowed to retrieve a
disposition from the context. 6
(31) a. Context: All by accident, I pressed a switch button on a spacecraft,
causing the Mars passengers in the resting cabins to cryogenically
freeze. That button, when pressed, freezes any human in the cabins,
and automatically unfreezes them three months later. Luckily, we
didn’t have to wait that long. A crew member was able to unfreeze













Lit: ‘By accident, I froze the Mars passengers for 3 months.’
2 Mars passengers remained frozen for three months
5 Is RSM ambiguous?
In the previous section, we have shown how we can derive the modal reading of RSM
which allows us to report a non-actual duration for an actual result state. We have
argued that this is made possible by the DISP head that builds a modal claim into
the truth conditions. We have also considered some contexts where DISP head is not
licensed (i.e. when no disposition ascription is possible). When this is the case, we
6 The context sensitivity of DISP allows any contextually salient disposition holder to be inserted into
the meaning of RSM. The question of whether this must be restricted in some way is beyond the
scope of this paper and awaits further research.
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need to have logical forms without DISP, from which we derive the actual duration
entailment for actual result states.
Notably, the morphology does not tell us when the DISP head is part of the logical
form or not. Therefore, it may appear that RSM phrases are ambiguous between a
plain and modal durative interpretation. In this section, we argue that the ambiguity
is only apparent and there is in fact a ‘deterministic’ interpretation of RSM phrases.
The generalization is that the DISP head is part of the logical form whenever it is
licensed. In other words, RSM phrases need to have the modal durative interpretation,
whenever a unique salient disposition can be retrieved.
Recall that in all contexts where the DISP head is not licensed, RSM phrases
describe the actual duration of an actual result state. For example, in (16), we have
the entailment that the city remained buried under the ashes for a thousand years.
Since a volcanic eruption cannot have a disposition towards burying a city for a
specific period of time, the DISP head is clearly not licensed here. The only possible
logical form will lack the DISP head, which explains why we have the actual duration
entailment.
Notably, there are also contexts that do not allow us to use the DISP head, even
though the causer is an intentional agent. For example, in (32b), the agent has a clear
disposition towards stopping the water flow for two hours. Yet, when uttered in the
context provided in (32a), the sentence in (32b) is judged false. The RSM phrase in
(32b) accurately describes the intended duration for the result state but it is still not
acceptable. The fact that (32b) is judged false suggests that the sentence entails that
the water flow remained stopped for two hours, contrary to fact. This is verified by
the sentence in (32c), which is acceptable in the context. This is fully predicted if
the DISP head cannot be used, forcing the plain durative interpretation for the RSM
phrase.
(32) a. Context: Because of excessive precipitation and lack of proper infras-
tructure, your house was flooded last month. Upon realizing that the
water started to come into your house, you called the authorities for
help, who said a vacuum truck would be there in two hours. So, you
intended to stop the water flow by all means for a period of two hours.
But you only managed to stop the water flow for half an hour. You tell













Lit: ‘That day, I stopped the water for two hours.’
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Lit: ‘That day, I stopped the water for half an hour.’
The empirical facts suggest that the DISP head cannot be used in this context.
But what explains this finding? There is an intentional agent with a clear disposition
towards achieving a result state for a particular period of time. We argue that this
is a situation where the agent’s disposition is not the only one at play. There is a
sharp difference from a state like ‘the box being on the table for two hours’. The
box and the table have no dispositions that can influence the duration of a result state
that contains them. However, in the context involving the flood in (32a), there are
different dispositions at play. At the very least, we additionally have the water flow,
which itself is a force capable of influencing for how long the result state can be
maintained. In other words, there is both a positive disposition towards the result
state (i.e. the agent’s) and a negative disposition towards the same result state (i.e.
the water flow’s). Therefore, even when the result state is achieved, its duration
cannot be guaranteed by the speaker’s intention alone.7 Perhaps, we can interpret the
impossibility of using the DISP head as the inability of retrieving a unique disposition
towards that result state.
Hence, the plain durative reading of RSM is forced when the DISP head is not
licensed. We have seen that there are at least two situations where the DISP head is
not licensed: when no disposition ascription is possible, and when there is more than
one disposition at play relevant for the duration of a result state. However, we have
not yet shown whether the plain durative interpretation of RSM is available even
when the DISP head is licensed. That is, can we have contexts where an intentional
causer K causes a result state but the duration RSM reports is distinct from what K
intended? This is not trivial because we diagnose the modal reading of RSM by a
cancellation test. So, when the DISP head is licensed, speakers can and will choose to
parse the sentence with the DISP head so as to make the follow-up sentence felicitous.
However, we can still distinguish the actual duration from the intended duration
within contexts where the intended duration is shorter than the actual duration.
For example, the context in (33a) makes it clear that the relevant result state
lasted for one week although it was intended to last exactly three days. Nevertheless,
the sentence in (33b) which tries to report the actual duration of Ali’s stay in Ankara
is judged false.
7 There are situations that require more than one disposition in the realization of result states. These
situations seem to be parallel to what is referred to as colliders in causal models (Copley 2021). As
far as we can see, collider contexts force the plain durative reading of RSM.
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(33) a. Last year, Ali went to a linguistics conference in Ankara, intending to
stay there for exactly three days since the conference lasted for 3 days.
However, he broke his leg in Ankara and had to stay in hospital for















Lit: ‘Last year, Ali went to Ankara for a week.’
The context provided in (33a) makes it clear that the intended duration for the
result state is exactly 3 days. However, Ali stayed in Ankara for a week after all.
In this context, the sentence in (33b) is judged false, indicating that it cannot be
interpreted as ‘Ali initiated a state S of being in Ankara and S was one-week-long’.
Even though other explanations may be possible here, it is clear that this reading
cannot be generated when the DISP head is part of the structure. What the DISP head
would do is to attribute the disposition towards staying in Ankara for a week to Ali.
Given that this is a false attribution, the presence of the DISP head fully predicts the
judgment for (33b). Crucially, the data at hand may be showing us that the DISP head
must be used whenever it is licensed. Speakers apparently cannot posit a logical
form for (33b) without DISP. If that were possible, the sentence in (33b) could be
judged true.
To summarize our claims, RSM is not really ambiguous between a plain and a
modal reading. It seems that its basic interpretation corresponds to the structure
that features the DISP head. However, when the DISP head is not licensed, its inter-
pretation seems to be coerced into a plain durative modifier without the DISP head.
The finding that the DISP head must be used whenever it is licensed might follow
from the intricate relationships between causality, result states and dispositions. A
more thorough investigation, supplemented with cross-linguistic data, awaits further
research.
6 Conclusion
This study investigated the distribution of the two readings of a durative modifier
that only targets result states in Turkish. We called this modifier RSM, standing
for Result State Modifier, and we showed that it can express the actual duration or
a non-actual duration of a result state. We argued that only when the non-actual
duration reading is unavailable, does the actual duration interpretation surfaces.
Our discussion demonstrated that the non-actual duration interpretation of RSM
is generated when there is a disposition ascription available towards the duration of
a result state. We proposed that the disposition ascription is mediated by a DISPP
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projection. Furthermore, we defended the idea that the basic structure corresponding
to RSM has to contain DISPP whenever it is licensed. More specifically, RSM is
coerced into a plain durative modifier only when DISPP is not licensed, i.e. when
there is no unique salient disposition holder salient in the context. The reason why
DISPP is not simply optional in contexts where it is licensed remains as an important
question for future research.
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